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PREPARING STUDENTS FOR PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES BASED ON AN AXIOLOGICAL APPROACH REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN

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ABSTRACT. This article analyzes the problem of axiology, the history of its development and the results of research. The content of axiology is based on the need and circumstances of its development in students. The article also provides suggestions and recommendations for the development of a corporate system, stages and pedagogical model of development in the history of philosophical development of value problems.

Key words: and concepts: axiology, Philosophy of values, professional competence, objective subject, corporate system, qualification requirements, model, axiological movement.

AXIOLOGY (Greek ξία - value and λόγος - education) - category "value"; philosophical science, studying the description, structure and hierarchy of the value world, the ways of its knowledge and ontological status, as well as the nature and uniqueness of value judgments. Axiology involves the study of the full range of other philosophical as well as individual scientific disciplines, broadly defined as social, artistic and religious practice, human civilization and culture. The term "axiology" was introduced by the French philosopher P. Lapi in 1902 and was soon introduced by I. Kreibig in the same year. The term "thymology" (Greek: τιμή - price) replaced it, and in 1904 E. von Hartmann introduced it as one of the main components of the system.

In the history of philosophical development of value problems, several periods stand out. From ancient times, one could talk about "contextual character." At the same time, neither the category of values, nor the world of values, nor the opinions of values have yet become the subject of specialized philosophical thinking. Only from the second half of the 19th century has this problem become one of the priorities of European culture. In the history of axiology, at least three main periods can be distinguished as a specialized philosophical discipline: pre-classical, classical and post-classical.

PRECLASSIC PERIOD (1860s-80s). With its widespread introduction into philosophy, the category of value was assigned to R. G. Lotz. Like many philosophers who followed Kant, he believed that a value worldview is a certain "openness" that determines values and relationships. It is no less authentic than a mental study to know the valuable world, and without the senses of the subject there are no values, because they cannot belong to things in themselves, but this does not mean that these things are only subjective. In favor of "objectivity" is an intersub corresponding to their general meaning for a transcendent "empirical" subject; judgments of the appraiser are related to the objects being valued; He did not have "valuable feelings," but he "resisted" him in the form of an already formed system of things. Moreover, since ethics is the "beginning" of metaphysics, it is "to some extent

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conditioned by existence." In Axiological Gnoseology, Lotse separates the concept (Begriff) and thought (Gedanke): the first is the objective meaning of the determined, the second is the meaning and value of Geltung.

The Lotsk philosopher and theologian A. Ritschl (1822-89), in contrast to scientific or metaphysical ideas that differ from theoretical ones, connects them with the expression of objects of faith. However, he went even further, stressing that any knowledge associated with it will not only be accompanied by emotions, but will also become a bearer of will, since attention is needed to achieve the goal. But the will is to do something worthy of desire.

The third founder of classical axiology was the Austrian philosopher F. Brentano, who developed the doctrine of inner experience as a source of self-expression of mental phenomena. The classification of these phenomena is carried out in accordance with their intensive nature, depending on the way of viewing objects. In "Psychology from an Empirical Point of View" (1874), he divided all spiritual phenomena into classes of imagination, reasoning and experience (Gemütsbewegungen), the second of which is responsible for the feelings of pleasure and discontent experienced by the subject in relation to objects, valuable reasoning (Brentano F Selected Cases, 1996, No. 82-83).

The cultural philosophy of this period should increase interest in values. F. Nietzsche in The Will of the Authorities outlined the aphoristic requirements of the Umwertung aller Werte in the categories of "purpose," "unity" and "existence" of values that actually belong to the imaginary world. In a world in which "reorientation" is devalued, there must be an era of true faith in the values associated with the "real" needs of a self-fulfilling and self-proclaimed person. Nietzsche believes that the "will to power" is the basis of the world of true values.

CLASSICAL ERA (1890-1920). The value problem quickly became dominant in European opinion.

According to some modern classifications, classical axiology should be considered as a single unit that studies general laws that study the structure and hierarchy of "official" axiology - value relations and "material" values. To these two it was possible to add an axiological "ontology" - the question of the subjectivity of values, their localization and connection with existence, "as well as the question of the relationship between "epistemology" - values and knowledge. These four areas essentially constitute a fundamental theory of values.

1. in official axiology, some axiological axioms are systematized, which primarily correspond to what can be called value logic. Four axioms are already created by Brentano. M. Scheler in his fundamental work "Material Ethics of Moral Formalities and Values" (1913-16) added the relationship between values and positions in relation to them: firstly, only values exist or should not exist; second, there should be only positive values, not negative ones. In addition, the relationship between those and those who belong to the "right to exist" includes: everything has the right to exist, but not the right to exist, on the contrary, does not have the right to exist. In the end, he formulated a rule reminiscent of the law from which the third was excluded: the same value cannot be either positive or negative.

2. The hierarchization of the main classes of values has been carried out more than once in classical axiology. E. von Hartmann (1895) was one of the first to mention it, proposing the

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following line: Plato's "Phileb," which resembles a hierarchy of pleasure, expediency, beauty, morality, and preference.

The broader hierarchy in the "Philosophy of Values" (1908) belonged to G. Münsterberg, who distinguished the following classes: "self-sufficiency," "consent," "activity," "implementation"; life and cultural values; existence, unity, development (related to life values, formation, movement), divine values; interconnectedness, beauty, "production," worldview.

A deep understanding of the hierarchy of values is found in Scheler. He writes: "The realm of all values is a hierarchy in which values are" above "or" below "each other. This hierarchy, like the division into "positive" and "negative" values, proceeds from the essence of values and does not extend only to "known" values. av. M., 1994, NO. 305). Intuitively, the concept of one value or another (in the platonic sense) In Scheler it is called "advantage" (Vorzugsevidenz). In the first case, we are talking about empirical, and in the second - about priority. Someone who prefers a "nice" "noble" value will have an inductive experience in a better world than someone who doesn't. Since the hierarchy of values is ontologically different from their empirical bearers, Scheler believes that it is "absolutely unchanged" for all subjects, although its "rules" that appear in history always change. Each time in the "act of dignity" you need to understand what value is greater than the other.

In the hierarchy of values, it is necessary to distinguish between two orders, one of which regulates relationships in accordance with their essential carriers, and the other in accordance with the modality of values. Both valuables and people can contain valuables. But, in addition to them, the bearers of value are certain "acts" (knowledge, love and hatred, will), functions (hearing, vision, feeling, etc.), answers (joy from something, including attitude towards others, etc.), spontaneous acts. The most important hierarchy - value modality itself - is depicted in four sequences:

1) strings of values "pleasant" and "unpleasant." These include "emotions" and their modes - joy and suffering, and "emotions" - emotion and pain;

2) a set of values of feelings. We are talking about all the qualities that cover the "noble" and "low" sides. These include values such as "wellbeing" and "wellbeing." At the level of the situation, all modules of the sense of life correspond to them - "rise" and "decline," health and illness, etc. In response - joy and grief, in the form of instinctive reactions - courage and fear, a rush of fame, anger, etc.;

3) areas of spiritual values: "beautiful" and "ugly," as well as the entire range of pure aesthetic values; "fair" and "unfair," that is, the field of moral values; the values of knowing the truth that philosophy seeks to implement (according to Scheler, science is also guided by the goals of "dominating events"). From all this come cultural values that by their nature are more related to wealth, that is, to material carriers of wealth (art treasures, scientific institutions, legislation and others). Correlation of spiritual values - spiritual joy and sadness, reaction - disposition and absence, approval and approval, respect and disrespect, spiritual sympathy for friendship, and others;

4) the modality of "saints" and "non-saints" is the highest modality. Its main difference is that it manifests itself only in what is given as "absolute" in intention. In this respect, all other values are his symbols. It combines feelings of "happiness" and "despair," "faith" and "disbelief,"

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"surprise," "prayer" and the like. By contrast, love is what masters sacred values. Therefore, in the "sacred" sphere it is necessary to be an independent value and "value a person." Prayers and rituals express respect.

Each of these four modalities corresponds to its "pure personalities": pleasure artist, hero or driver, genius and saint. The corresponding communities are simple forms of the so-called "societies," life society (state), legal and cultural community, love society (church).

E. Spranger in "Life Forms" (1914) proposes to differentiate the level of values depending on whether they can be attributed to means or goals. In the trilogy "Personality and Thing" (1924) V. Stern identifies goals and carriers.

3. The "state of value," like the document of cognition, provides for the presence of three necessary components: the subject (in this case, the "appraiser"), the object ("appraisable") and some relationship between them ("appraisal"). Disagreements were not related to their true recognition, but to a comparative assessment of their "value position" and, accordingly, the ontological status of values. Here, the main positions are associated with attempts to localize values mainly in the subject being evaluated, mainly in the subject being evaluated, and, finally, in both.

1) a subjectivist interpretation of the attitude towards value, which, in turn, is distinguished by three positions, which are mainly related to the beginning of spiritual activity: the desires and needs of the subject, his volitional goals or his inner feelings.

The first of these positions was defended by the Austrian philosopher H. Ehrenfels, who argued that "the value of an object is its will," and that" value is the relationship between an object and a subject who would like one or another object or even did not believe in its existence. " He argued that "the magnitude of value is proportional to desire." (Ehrenfels C. won. System der Werttheorie, Bd. I.p., 1987, S. 53, 65).

The voluntaristic interpretation of values that go into the edging was developed by G. Schwartz, who directly or indirectly called them the goal of the will (Willenziele). " According to G. Cohen, joy and discontent are not a sign or "guarantee" of value, but should "generate values that may have value" (Cohen H. system der Philosophie, Th. Ethik des reinen Willens. V., 1904, S5. 155).

English intellectuals who developed the idea of spirituality and inner feeling, and then the inner perception of Jum, Baumgarten and Mayer and Tetens, and then the inner feeling, which in the concept of "feeling" is considered as a localization of values, philosophers after quantum also found many supporters, including Berweg, Schuppe, Dilthey and others. Axiologists, who to a certain extent demanded the localization of values in a spiritual sense, objected to the object being considered invaluable, but refused to single out any special "values" from the subject. F. Hiller supported this idea, believing that values are not a "split subject," but integral property. E. von Hartmann believed that in order to realize a valuable location, interaction with logical thinking, inner feeling and the will that determines the goal is necessary. A. Riehl explicitly said that values such as ideas go back to reason, feelings and aspirations of the spirit;

2) the "objective subject" should include primarily followers of Lotse and Brentano. For example, the Austrian philosopher A. Mainon in his book "Psychological and Moral Studies of

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the Theory of Values" (1897) sharply criticized many of the foundations of subjectivity. For example, he considered it pointless to try to take away the value of this object from its will or ability to satisfy our needs, since he sees the opposite in this relationship. A. Meinong believed that the subjectivity of valuable experiences proves that one object awakens a different feeling in different people, and that sometimes he sees in his values only a sign of value, the only thing that leaves room for irrelevant values that are not limited by the framework. In criticism of naturalist subjectivists, J. Moore was in solidarity with him, believing that "our emotional states do not create an idea of the values of the corresponding objects, but vice versa." Value can be described as an irresistible but objective feature of the subject. According to I. Heid, neither the sense of the value of the subject, nor the properties of the object themselves form values, but form their basis. The Bible says that there is a special relationship between an "object of value" and its "object of value." B., 1926.

The subject of objective interpretation of values can also include the axiology of E. Husserl, which he called evaluative documents in "Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy" (1913). These documents define its two-sided orientation. When I do this, I just "catch" things and at the same time "pay attention" to valuable things. The second is the intensive correlation (object) of my assessment report. Therefore, the "state of value" is a particular state of intense attitude, and values should be one of the types of existence;

3) objective axiology emphasizes that there is a kingdom ontologically independent of the subject. " The founder of this direction is rightfully M. Scheler. The organization of the Kingdom of values, according to Scheler, is clearly manifested in the consideration of its "material axiology," primarily the hierarchical structure of this kingdom, which is a complete organic unity. He highlighted the distinction between values and their bearers. Those who carry valuable qualities include about the same good deeds as the eidos themselves. Such values are described as "true qualities" and "perfect objects." Like Plato's Eidos, they can blush regardless of their carriers. Their understanding is carried out through intuitive thinking, which is as unacceptable as hearing, in order to distinguish intellectual colors.

Scheler's follower N. Hartmann develops in Morality the concept of the kingdom of values. He calls values "meaning." "But they are not open to formal images, but to their content, "material," "structures," the subjects to which they aspire, relationships and personalities" (Hartmann n N. B., 1926, S. 109). Everything can be valuable only through ownership of values, because truth does not relate to the world of values, but virtue through them. " But the realm of values penetrates our world from the outside, and this can be felt under the influence of "responsibility or guilt." These moral phenomena exist, but are unique. In other words, "for him there is a true realm of values, a true intelligent universe situated on the other side of both truth and consciousness," and it aims at an existence that is not subjective, like any act of true cognition, whereby the knowledge of values is both true and false (in the same place, S. 146, 153);

4) If Scheler and N. Hartmann singled out a separate kingdom of being for values, V. Windelband contrasted values with "existence," and G. Rickert believed that expanding reality until values were embedded in it would not lead to an awareness of their importance. The will that determines the goal can have transcendental, universal significance only if it rises above the causal laws and the interconnections of nature and history. In other words, values constitute

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"an absolutely independent realm lying behind subject and object." - "Logos," 1910, book. I, Art. 33). Theoretical sciences may know how important values are, but they do not rely on their results and, accordingly, cannot be surprised by the latter. Indeed, there is a field of truth that provides value theory with material for its research - it is the "world of culture" associated with values. History, as a science of culture, allows us to determine that the subject "takes possession of the world of values in time and formation, but the source of this education is beyond it, which determines its" historical features. "

4. The development of knowledge values mainly concerned the Baden school. Windelband defined the boundaries of philosophy and the exact sciences by defining philosophy as "the science of important and important definitions of values." Spirit and history. M., 1995, NO. 39). This was based on an ontological dualism of values and essence: if the being is the subject of the exact sciences, philosophy must turn to the world of values to avoid repeating them. However, Windelband held to the epistemological presumption that the learning process itself was normal. Any "practical" and "theoretical" reasoning involves evaluating its content. Nevertheless, there is a separate area of knowledge of values associated with an ideological approach to culture. These rules develop in Rickert: the duty to judge is related to will and feeling; even purely theoretical knowledge includes evaluation. any claim that I know something is based on a sense of recognition or denial of something; one can only admit what is valuable.

This position was also close to Husserl, who believed that any specific action of the mind aimed at mastering the truth comes from the "hidden environment of fundamental values," a horizon of life in which the "I" can, at his discretion, restore his feelings of epistemological and scientific conclusions.

M. Weber paid special attention to the importance of valuable components in scientific knowledge. The values of a scientist are not subjective, not arbitrary, they are associated with his time and the spirit of culture. The spirit of "intersub" also determines the axiological instructions of the scientific community, which evaluate the results of research. However, the "idea of value" is of particular importance to the science of culture (including Weber's sociology).

POST-CLASSICAL PERIOD (1930s). The theoretical significance of the modern stage of axiology is modest compared to the classical one. The modern "axiological movement" can be limited to three aspects: the problem of axiology, which some leading philosophers of the 20th century are forced to accept; separate directions of development of classical models of fundamental axiology; popularization of axiology in the form of the development of "applied" axiological research.

First point. M. Heidegger's critical reaction to the achievement of classical axiology is explained by the fact that a feeling of dissatisfaction with the "worship of values" was formed in his philosophy, partly with his own "worship of existence." Like Nietzsche, he "overestimates all values," but in this case he seeks to "deaxiologize" philosophy and life, rather than replacing ghosts with real values, without which it is impossible to "ontologize" them. According to Heidegger, the very concept of "value" is logical: goodness is determined by value, and it is determined by good; relationship with the concepts of meaning, purpose and foundations of the same value; in other words, axiology brings us into a logical framework

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(Heidegger M. Time and existence. M., 1993, No. 71-72) Thus, in a certain sense, there are false concepts that are responsible for the false existence of a person: humanity naively believes that any attempt on them could jeopardize its existence "in fact, the value becomes a cover for what is weak and" has lost the volume and background of what has passed", He is responsible for man to live a false life, measuring and counting everything, and in values this existence can be compared with the cave of Plato from him the true human existence must be "separated" (p. 56, 210, 361). Abandoning values does not mean nihilism, which can be considered a "prudent person"; on the contrary, the evaluation of everything is "subjectivation," which "leaves existence indivisible, and in the right to the object of evaluation is only counted." Therefore, opposition to values means "opposition to the subjectivization of existence until it becomes manifest," as well as "enlightenment of primitive truth".

In axiology, B. Russell is not satisfied with metaphysics, which Heidegger categorically denied in axiology: the problem of axiology has complete knowledge, since it refers only to the field of education (although, as you know, it does not dispute the definition); differences in values depend on taste (although in the field of taste, apparently, relate only to the oyster). L. Wittgenstein's cautious attitude towards values emphasizes their "uncertainty" and relativism.

Second point. Among the three main areas of modern fundamental axiology, two - naturalistic and phenomenological - continue the traditions of classical axiology, and the third, implemented within the framework of Anglo-American analytical philosophy, is indirectly related to the previous period.

1. axiological naturalism comes from the postulate of the value of the subject (still criticized by Maynog and Murom), because he has everything he wants and what he does not want, because it becomes valuable - precisely in relation to what becomes the value of the subject (sense of need or pleasure) if there is disagreement. Ideas of naturalism by Perry (as a result of interests), C. Morris (as a result of needs), C. Lewis (as "long-term satisfaction"), but here the most important person is J. Duy. "Valuation theory" In 1939, he identifies values, intentions and desires that "evoke" in him more valuable relationships than in his predecessors (In desires, which are the basis of value attitudes, two degrees are distinguished - motivation and interest, which, in addition to intentions, imply knowledge of any object), as well as real and valuable reasoning. First, "I Love Something," "I Love Something," second, "It Deserves Attention," "It Should Be Enjoyable," and others. All value judgments are experimental judgments, so they must be subjected to experimental analysis similar to scientific judgment. Today, the inclusion of values in behavior regulation mechanisms is very common: A. Maslow's monograph "Psychology of Being" (1968) is cited as an example, in which value is interpreted as the principle of choice inherent in any living being (from chicken to man), as well as "There are no values by R. Kenny directed thinking" (1992).

2. followers of phenomenology, on the contrary, consider considerations of values not empirical, but oriented synthetic, and axiology as a whole priority sciences. Among them, the Polish philosopher and aesthetician R. Ingarden stands out, who in an axiological context distinguished between aesthetic and theoretical experiences and corresponding views (for example, to distinguish between mental experiences and Brentano's judgments). An aesthetic setting implies a connection with a work of art carried out with special pleasure, which means evaluating the subject of the experiment without objectifying the assessment.

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3. Developed by analysts led by A.J. Ayer! the thesis on unfunding the concepts of value - on the basis of their inconsistency with the real referent, neither in the subject nor in the object of value relation. There is the very fact of evaluation, according to which one can study psychology as psychological proof, sociology as sociological proof, "metaaxiology" as language proof. The concepts and considerations of evaluation, in fact, do not mean anything and do not mean, but only express certain emotions. Negative attitude to the meaning of values is overcome by representatives of the same direction - J. Hormson, R. Brandt, as well as R. Heer. During a conversation with Ayer in The Language of Morals (1952), he explores typological differences between factual and valuable opinions in the context of descriptive and prescriptive statements. It highlights differences in values and interests. Her also reflects on the existence of hypothetical values. Along with other axiologists, he develops the concept of preference (HareR). Essays on Political Morality. Ahf., 1989, p. 239-242, 84, 117, 133). Axiology has never been a priority of national philosophy (It is enough to be critical of the axiology of the Baden school), among Russian philosophers N.O. Lossko Criticizing the main German axiological theories (1931), he tried to create a model of values based on a theistic personality, defending God's highest concept of "self-esteem" (correspondence of existence and value), not subjective, but striving for "completeness of existence" (therefore, one can see Heidegger's direct opponent in it) as the source of the entire value system. Non-eistic axiological personalism is developed by M.M. Bakhtin, who multiplies the diversity of individuals

Third point. It is legal to talk about "practical" axiology, primarily in connection with the axiological foundations of morality. Among the works in this direction, one can note the monograph by F. von Kuchera "Fundamentals of Morality" (1982), in which not only knowledge of experience and objectivity of values, but also the creation of all moral problems (in a broad sense) is carried out on the basis of an axiological approach. According to Kuchera, values are the highest regulatory framework. Based on this, ethics is divided into verification of regulatory, descriptive and meta-ethical considerations.

The philosophy of science emphasizes the values of science. This aspect of science was studied by I. Lakatos, and then T. Kun, who noted the importance in the history of science of not only objective, but also subjective selection criteria between competitive theories, including values. These factors of the development of science are also studied by S. Tulmin and Laudan, who analyze the hierarchical structure of scientific discussions in the monograph "Science and Values" (1984) and distinguish between levels corresponding to factual, methodological and, finally, axiological components. It is now becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between areas of knowledge that do not use axiological guidance, or at least terms. Axiological publications are experiencing another excitement. Many conferences and symposia are held on a wide range of axiological problems. Many special collections are published related to socio-political and cultural manuals on axiology; A special international periodical, "Journal of Value Inguire," is published. At the same time, the "practical" and "pragmatic" aspects of axiology are increasingly popular in modern culture, which are "compensated" by a decrease in its status among the fundamental, philosophical sciences (not only in English-speaking countries, but also in Germany). Axiology researchers emphasize the serious problems associated with its "theoretical foundations," as well as the methodological chaos that dominates the definition of the concept of "value" and the interpretation of value relations, not to mention attempts to localize axiology in the general structure of philosophical speech.

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