This article examines the evolving approaches to addressing white-collar and corporate crime, focusing on the shift from traditional criminal prosecution towards negotiated settlements, specifically Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs) and Non-Prosecution Agreements (NPAs). It reviews the historical context, driven partly by concerns over the impact of corporate indictments, and analyzes the characteristics and increasing prevalence of DPAs and NPAs. Drawing upon legal scholarship, government policy statements, and empirical research, the article discusses the perceived benefits of these agreements, such as efficiency and mandated compliance reforms, alongside significant criticisms. Key concerns include the potential for insufficient individual accountability, lack of judicial oversight and transparency, and debated effectiveness in deterring future misconduct. The article synthesizes findings on the outcomes and challenges associated with DPAs and NPAs, highlighting the ongoing debate about balancing corporate accountability with the broader goals of justice and deterrence in the context of complex organizational crime.

White-collar crime, Corporate crime, Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution Agreements, Criminal prosecution

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